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Abstract—Block outlier detection methods, based on Tietjen-
Moore (TM) and Shapiro-Wilk (SW) tests, are proposed to detect
and suppress spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks
by malicious users in cooperative spectrum sensing. First, we
consider basic and statistical SSDF attacks, where the malicious
users attack independently. Then we propose a new SSDF attack,
which involves cooperation among malicious users by masking.
In practice, the number of malicious users is unknown. Thus, it
is necessary to estimate the number of malicious users, which is
found using clustering and largest gap method. However, we show
using Monte Carlo simulations that, these methods fail to estimate
the exact number of malicious users when they cooperate. To
overcome this, we propose a modified largest gap method.
Index Terms—Block outlier detection, cooperative spectrum
sensing, malicious user, spectrum sensing data falsification attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Data Falsification in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing
In cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), multiple secondary
users (SUs) cooperate to effectively detect a primary user (PU),
by exploiting the spatial diversity. However, the cooperation
among SUs raises concerns about reliability and security of
CSS, as some of the SUs may report the falsified spectrum
sensing data to the fusion centre. The falsified reported data
can easily influence the spectrum sensing decision taken by
the fusion centre. The falsification of data may occur either
by malfunctioning of SUs or by intentional manipulation of
data by certain SUs, called malicious users (MUs). The data
reported by malfunctioning SUs may differ from the actual
data. In addition, MUs can attack by manipulating the reported
data with selfish intention, i.e., to gain access to the channel,
or to cause interference to PU. Since the spectrum sensing
data is falsified in this attack, this is called spectrum sensing
data falsification (SSDF) attack [1].
An outlier is the data, that appears to be inconsistent with
rest of the data [2]. The local spectrum sensing data reported
by MUs may differ from the actual sensed data. Thus, MUs
reporting the falsified spectrum sensing data, can be considered
as outliers and detected using outlier detection techniques.
B. Summary of Results and Related Work
1) Summary of Results: Firstly, we propose two block
outlier detection methods, based on Tietjen-Moore (TM) test
[3] and Shapiro-Wilk (SW) test [4], to counter different SSDF
attacks in CSS as shown in Fig. 1, and compare them with box
plot and median absolute deviation (MAD) tests [5]. We show
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Fig. 1. SSDF attack models
that TM and SW tests are more robust to SSDF attacks than the
box plot and MAD tests. Secondly, we propose a new SSDF
attack, called cooperative attack, in CSS framework, which
involves cooperation among MUs by masking. Thirdly, for
cooperative attack, we propose a modified largest gap method,
which can accurately estimate the number of outliers, required
by TM and SW tests, whereas clustering [6] and the largest
gap method [3] fail to estimate the exact number of outliers.
2) Related Work: The basic SSDF attacks like “Always
Yes,” “Always No” and “Random” are studied in [1], [7]. In
[8], [9], the statistical attack is considered, where MUs act
maliciously with a certain probability. However, in these at-
tacks, no cooperation among MUs is considered. A consensus-
based method is proposed to overcome the basic SSDF attacks
[7]. To counter the statistical attack, in [8], an onion-peeling
approach based on calculation of suspicious levels is adopted,
while in [9], belief propagation is used. The reputation and
weight based methods try to alleviate the detrimental effects
of MUs by assigning trust values or weights to SUs based on
the credibility of SUs, and are studied in [10]–[14]. In [15], a
scenario is considered where multiple MUs can overhear the
honest SU sensing data. Two attack-prevention mechanisms
based on direct and indirect punishment are proposed to foil
such attacks.
In [16], an outlier detection method is proposed to pre-
filter the extreme data, followed by the calculation of weights
based on mean of the received spectrum sensing data. This
method is further extended in [17], where the outlier factors are
calculated using weighted sample mean and standard deviation
of the received sensing data. Based on the dynamic PU activity
and the sensing data from the closest SUs, the outlier factors
are adjusted. In [5], the detection performances of different
outlier methods like MAD, box plot and median rule, are
compared under low SNR nodes scenario (similar to “Always
No” attack). Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test is used in
[18] to detect MUs by checking whether empirical distribution
of SUs fit the expected distribution of a MU. In [19], the outlier
TABLE I
MAIN NOTATIONS
Notation Meaning
H1 Hypothesis when the primary user is present.
H0 Hypothesis when the primary user is absent.
M Number of sensing samples.
α Received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at SU.
PFA Probability of false alarm at a single SU.
PD Probability of detection at a single SU.
QFA Probability of false alarm at fusion centre.
QD Probability of detection at fusion centre.
L Number of malicious SUs.
P Number of honest SUs.
N Number of cooperating SUs.
tests like Dixon’s test, box plot and Grubbs’ test are studied
to detect a single MU with basic attacks in CSS.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a centralized CSS scenario with N SUs, one PU
and a fusion centre. Secondary users perform local spectrum
sensing using energy detection [20] and report the sensed
energies to the fusion centre. Let H1 and H0 denote the
binary hypothesis corresponding to the presence and absence
of PU respectively. Then the detection problem of PU can be
formulated as follows:
y(m) =
{
s(m) + u(m), H1,
u(m), H0,
(1)
where y(m) is the mth sample of the received signal by a SU
with m = 1, . . . ,M , s(m) ∼ CN(0, σ2s), is the PU signal,
and u(m) ∼ CN(0, σ2u), is additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN). We assume that s(m) and u(m) are independent.
The primary signal samples are assumed to be independent.
Also, we assume that the noise samples are independent. The
received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is α = σ2s
σ2u
.
The test statistic T for the energy detector is given by [20]
T (y) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
|y(m)|2, (2)
and it is chi-squared distributed. However, for large M (M >
10), the test statistic can be approximated by Gaussian dis-
tribution according to central limit theorem. For this, the
expressions of the probability of false alarm PFA and the
probability of detection PD are given as follows [21]:
PFA = Q
[(
λ
σ2u
− 1
)√
M
]
;PD = Q
[(
λ
σ2u
− α− 1
) √
M
α+ 1
]
,
where λ is a predetermined threshold. The fusion centre uses
Majority logic [21] as a fusion rule, i.e., the final decision
taken by the fusion centre is consistent with the local decisions
taken by majority of SUs. The probability of false alarm and
the probability of detection after fusing the local decisions at
the fusion centre are denoted by QFA and QD respectively.
Let L and P be the number of the malicious and the honest
SUs respectively. We assume that the majority of SUs are
honest (L < P ). Thus, the falsified spectrum sensing data
(falsified energy values in our case) by MUs, do not agree
with the majority of the data reported by the honest users.
Using outlier techniques, such malicious SUs are detected, and
removed from cooperation to detect PU. The final decision
about PU is made by fusing the local spectrum sensing
decisions of only honest SUs.
III. COOPERATIVE ATTACK
The basic and statistical attack models assume that MUs act
independently, i.e., they do not cooperate among themselves.
However, the more effective SSDF attacks may be launched
if MUs cooperate with each other. In the proposed model, we
consider that MUs cooperate using masking. It is seen that
the outlier tests suffer from the problem of masking [22]. In
masking, there exists extreme as well as not-so-extreme (mild)
outliers. The extreme outliers modify the test statistic of an
outlier test used to detect outliers such that, the presence of
not-so-extreme outliers is shadowed by the extreme outliers,
i.e., the outlier test fails to detect the not-so-extreme outliers,
and only the extreme outliers are detected.
In the framework of CSS with energy detection, masking
can be done as follows: A fraction of MUs report significantly
different energy values than the actual sensed values, and the
remaining MUs report slightly different energy values than the
actual sensed values. This alters the test statistic used by an
outlier test to detect outliers. The alteration in the test statistic
is made such that, MUs which have reported slightly different
energy values, escape from getting declared as outliers. Thus,
they can continue to send the falsified sensing data to the
fusion centre to influence the spectrum sensing decision.
IV. MULTIPLE OUTLIERS DETECTION
The multiple outliers can be present in three locations of
the sorted data as follows:
• Upper outlier: Unexpected large values.
• Lower outlier: Unexpected small values.
• Bi-directional outliers: Both upper and lower outliers are
present.
An outlier test should be able to identify all types of outliers.
To know the type of an outlier, it is required to apply outlier
tests designed for upper, lower or bi-directional outliers, on the
received data. The data declared as outliers, are categorized as
upper, lower or bi-directional outliers, based on which outlier
test has detected them as outliers. An outlier test can be applied
using either of the following two procedures:
• Consecutive procedure: It is also called recursive proce-
dure, that makes repeated use of a single outlier detection
test, to remove outliers one by one. However, it is
inappropriate to use a test for a single outlier detection
recursively to detect multiple outliers [2]. Also, even
though consecutive tests are easy to apply, they are
inefficient for large data with many outliers.
• Block procedure: In this procedure, the outliers are tested
in a block. The test requires calculation of the test statistic
based on the received data. The test statistic is compared
with the critical value, and based on this comparison, the
whole block of data is adjudged as either outlier or non-
outlier. In this paper, we consider two multiple outliers
detection tests based on block procedure as follows:
– Tietjen-Moore (TM) test
– Shapiro-Wilk (SW) test.
A. Tietjen-Moore Test
Tietjen and Moore proposed three test statistics [3] to detect
multiple outliers. All types of outliers, whether upper, lower
or bi-directional, can be tested by choosing a suitable test
statistic. The algorithm to detect upper or lower outliers is
given by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 TM Test for Upper/Lower Outliers
1: Sort the received energy values y1, . . . , yN of N SUs
in ascending order. Let this sorted values be denoted by
x1, . . . , xN .
2: Estimate t, the number of outliers (discussed in Section
IV-C).
3: Calculate the test statistic given in (3) (for upper outliers),
or given in (4) (for lower outliers).
4: Compare this test statistic with the critical value for
significance level of 0.05, from the table given in [3].
5: If the test statistic is less than the critical value, then the
suspected data are declared as outliers.
The test statistic for testing upper outliers is as follows [3]:
T =
∑N−t
j=1 (xj − x¯t)
2
∑N
j=1(xj − x¯)
2
, (3)
where x¯ is the sample mean and x¯t is given by x¯t =
∑N−t
j=1
xj
N−t
.
Similarly, the test statistic to test lower outliers is given by [3]
T ∗ =
∑N
j=t+1(xj − x¯
∗
t )
2
∑N
j=1(xj − x¯)
2
, (4)
where x¯∗t =
∑N
j=t+1
xj
N−t
. The algorithm for applying TM test
to detect bi-directional outliers is as follows:
Algorithm 2 TM Test for Bi-directional outliers
1: Compute the mean y¯ of the received energy values
y1, . . . , yN .
2: Compute N absolute residuals rj = |yj − y¯|, where
j = 1, . . . , N .
3: Arrange rjs in ascending order. Let this arranged data
be denoted by x1, . . . , xN .
4: Estimate t, the number of outliers.
5: Calculate the test statistic as per (3).
6: Perform steps 4 and 5 of Algorithm 1.
B. Shapiro-Wilk Test
This test, proposed by Shapiro and Wilk [4], is composed by
considering a linear combination of ordered data, squaring it
and then dividing it by an estimate of variance. The proposed
test statistic is location and scale invariant, and is suitable for
all types of data. The algorithm to apply SW test is given by
Algorithm 3. The test statistic for SW test is given as [4]
T =
∑[N
2
]
j=1 aN,N−j+1(xN−j+1 − xj)
2
S2
, (5)
where,
S2 =
N∑
j=1
(xj − x¯)
2 with x¯ =
∑N
j=1 xj
N
. (6)
Here, [N2 ] is the integer part of
N
2 , and aN,j is the tabulated
constant. The tables of tabulated constants and the critical
values for significance level of 0.05 are given in [4].
Algorithm 3 SW Test
1: Sort the received energy values y1, . . . , yN of N SUs
in ascending order. Let this sorted values be denoted by
x1, . . . , xN .
2: Estimate t, the number of outliers.
3: Calculate the test statistic as per (5) and (6).
4: If the test statistic is less than the critical value for
significance level of 0.05, then the suspected data are
declared as outliers.
C. Estimating the Number of Outliers
In practice, the number of MUs is not known. Also, to apply
TM and SW tests, an estimate of the number of outliers is
required. For this, we consider clustering and the largest gap
method proposed in the literature, and are described as follows:
1) Clustering method: We consider clustering as a tool to
estimate the number of outliers. We use k-means clustering
algorithm [6] to group the data set into two clusters. The
smaller of these clusters is treated as a cluster of suspected
outliers, and is tested against TM and SW tests, to decide
whether this assumption is true or not.
2) Largest gap method: Tietjen and Moore proposed a
method based on the largest gap between the data points, as a
basis to estimate the number of outliers [3]. For upper/lower
outliers, the procedure for the largest gap method is as follows:
Algorithm 4 Largest Gap method for Upper/Lower Outliers
1: Sort the received data (energy values) in ascending order
for upper outliers (descending order for lower outliers).
2: Calculate the gaps between successive data points.
3: Find the position of the largest gap.
4: The number of data points to the right of this position
gives an estimate of number of outliers.
The largest gap method for bi-directional outliers is given
as follows:
Algorithm 5 Largest Gap Method for Bi-directional Outliers
1: Sort the received data set (energy values) D in ascending
order and divide it into two halves, lower half DLH and
upper half DRH .
2: Apply largest gap method for upper outliers, proposed in
Algorithm 4 to DRH and largest gap method for lower
outliers to DLH , to get an estimate of number of outliers
in both halves.
3: Apply TM/SW test on both DRH and DLH separately,
to decide which half contains outliers.
We show in Section V that, when MUs launch cooperative
attack using masking, both clustering and largest gap method
fail to estimate the correct number of outliers. Thus, to
overcome this, we propose a modified largest gap (MLG)
method, which can give the suspected number of outliers
accurately under cooperative malicious users attack.
D. Proposed Method: Modified Largest Gap
The proposed modified largest gap method involves apply-
ing the largest gap method recursively until all the outliers are
detected. The algorithm to apply MLG for detection of upper
outliers is given as follows:
Algorithm 6 MLG method for Upper Outliers
1: Sort the received data set (energy values) D′ in ascending
order to obtain D.
2: Divide D in two halves: Lower half (DLH) and upper
half (DUH ).
3: As the number of outliers is in minority, DUH consists
of the energies reported by malicious users.
4: Calculate the gap between successive data points in DUH .
5: Find the position of the largest gap (denoted by Gpos).
6: Let S1 be the set of data points to the left of the Gpos in
DUH , and let S2 be the set of data points to the right of
the Gpos in DUH . Form a new set S = DLH ∪ S1.
7: Test whether S2 is outlier (using TM test).
8: If S2 is outlier, then reject S2; let D = S, and go to Step
2. Else, S ∪ S2 is a data set of honestly reported energy
values.
For lower outliers, the MLG method is the same as that
of upper outliers, except that the data is sorted in descending
order. The procedure to apply MLG for bi-directional outliers
is same as Algorithm 5, except the largest gap method is
replaced by the MLG method.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present Monte Carlo simulation results
to show the spectrum sensing performance of CSS with outlier
tests, to defend different SSDF attacks as shown in Fig. 1. In
simulations, we have considered the following parameters: σ2u
= 1, M = 10000, N = 20, L = 4. The energy value reported
by a MU differs from the actual sensed value by 0.5 dB.
A. Suppressing malicious users in the basic attack model
For “Always Yes” attack (Fig. 2), all the outlier tests
considered in this paper are able to detect all the MUs
successfully. It is shown that QFA can be decreased by
refraining MUs from participating in CSS, compared to when
all SUs including MUs participate in CSS. Also, the outlier
tests perform similarly for “Always No” attack (results are
not shown due to space constraint). However, for “Random”
attack (Fig. 3), TM and SW tests are more robust than the
box plot and MAD tests. This is because TM and SW tests
are able to detect all randomly behaving 4 MUs, but the box
plot and MAD tests can detect only a fraction of MUs, giving
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Fig. 2. “Always Yes” attack: Comparison of outlier tests, QD = 0.99.
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Fig. 3. “Random” attack: Comparison of outlier tests, SNR = -20 dB.
worse performance. Both clustering and the largest gap method
perform the same, when they are used to estimate the number
of outliers (Figs. 2 and 3). It can also be noticed that TM and
SW tests perform the same.
B. Suppressing malicious users in statistical attack model
It is shown in Fig. 4 that, TM and SW tests are good enough
to counter the statistical attack, when MUs act maliciously
with a certain probability. Clustering is used to estimate the
number of MUs for both TM and SW tests. Box plot’s
detection performance is almost the same as TM and SW tests,
while MAD test performs the worst.
C. Suppressing malicious users in cooperative attack model
As aforementioned, MUs may cooperate using masking. We
consider that all MUs are upper outliers. Masking is done, as
half of the outliers are extreme outliers reporting significantly
high energy values (6.5 dB greater than the actual sensed
energy in our case), and the rest are mild outliers reporting
slightly higher energy values than the actual energy values (0.5
dB greater than the actual sensed value). Then, as shown in
Fig. 5, TM or SW tests fail to counter cooperative attack when
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clustering or the largest gap method is used to estimate the
number of MUs. In clustering, the smaller cluster might consist
of only extreme outliers, and no mild outliers as the latter ones
may be masked by the former ones. For the largest gap method,
the largest gap occurs between mild outliers and extreme
outliers, as the energies reported by the extreme outliers are
significantly different from rest of the energy values. However,
the proposed modified largest gap method is highly effective in
estimating the accurate number of cooperating MUs, as it finds
the largest gap recursively until all the outliers are detected,
thus nullifying their harmful effects.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, two block outlier tests, TM test and SW test,
are proposed to suppress an unknown number of the malicious
users in cooperative spectrum sensing, and compared with box
plot and MAD tests. We have shown that TM and SW tests are
more robust than the box plot and MAD tests for “Random”
and statistical attacks. We have also proposed a cooperative
SSDF attack, which adopts cooperation among malicious users
by masking, where the presence of extreme outliers mask the
mild outliers. Also, it is shown using Monte Carlo simulations
that, clustering and the largest gap method fail to accurately
estimate the number of outliers in cooperative attack. Thus, to
overcome this shortcoming, we propose a modified largest gap
method, which can accurately estimate the number of outliers
under cooperative attack.
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